While few people these days would doubt the need for focusing a portion of instruction on grammar and vocabulary in the foreign language classroom, the question still remains: what exactly are the benefits of teaching grammar and vocabulary? Asking this question, which seems to have the rather obvious answer that students explicitly learn, practice and eventually put language to use, opens up the possibility that there are also more subtle roles that instruction may play in helping students move towards being more proficient users of the language. One subtle benefit of instruction may be that students later use this knowledge developed in the foreign language classroom to highlight and notice grammar and vocabulary in input. That is, students may become aware of forms they encounter in reading and listening that they otherwise wouldn’t have due to instruction highlighting grammar and vocabulary and making it more salient and noticeable. 

From a personal point of view, I have often wondered what happens to my students who do not master particular grammar or vocabulary which is taught in class. What do they take with them, and what impact have I had on them then? If one assumes that the goal of instruction is to affect change in learners’ behavior at the time of instruction, then it would seem like all teaching that does not do this has failed. Certainly, though, it can be seen from practical experience that this isn’t the case — learners appear to be quite able to become aware of something in class and then draw on this knowledge later to eventually master a particular form. But the question still remains: if change is not caused immediately in the class, unit, or course, then how is this information used in the long term for learning? What do students do, for example, with a memory that a particular point of grammar or word was taught, practiced or encountered in class? In this paper I will present evidence from a small-scale study done in Hungary which suggests that form-focused instruction may serve to move learners to become aware of and notice these forms in input.1

Background

The issue of ‘noticing’, or being conscious of forms in input, is directly related to the central question of what the role of explicit knowledge is in second language learning. In recent years there has been a great amount of debate over the issue of the degree to which consciousness and noticing of form are useful and necessary in language learning. For those who have already decided that consciousness of linguistic form is at least desirable — if not essential — in language learning, one of the benefits of this seemingly rather insignificant debate has been the resulting development of more refined descriptions and explanations of how explicit knowledge benefits second language acquisition as well as the seeking out of the cognitive foundations that underlie the learning and use of linguistic knowledge. 

In general, there are traditionally three approaches to the issue of consciousness in language learning around which the debate has occurred — the no-, strong- and weak-interface perspectives — each of which stakes a claim on the key point of whether or not there is an interface, or positive connection, between the development and use of explicit, or conscious knowledge and the implicit, tacit, or unconscious knowledge that underlies fluent competence in a language. The “no-interface” perspective is best put forth by Krashen (e.g. Krashen 1981; 1985) who claimed that the only roles for conscious knowledge of language are the monitoring of output and the slow and careful use of rules in controlled situations. On this view, explicit rules and consciousness do not lead to fluent competence. Most practicing language teachers would disagree with this extreme view and would find the debate on the possibility of learning without consciousness of little relevance to their classroom practice. Although the debate over this extreme view may have temporarily sidelined research on the role of explicit knowledge, due to Krashen’s critique it is no longer possible to simply assume that form focused instruction is necessarily effective, and because of this the actual benefits of instruction are under close scrutiny. 

It is this more subtle and specific proposal for the role of explicit knowledge expressed in the interface perspectives which is the context in which the issue of noticing is best understood. The ‘strong interface’ perspective (e.g. DeKeyser, 1998; Sharwood-Smith, 1993) proposes that second language acquisition can proceed very much along the same lines as the learning of any skill, that is beginning with the slow and appropriate use of conscious knowledge and rules, and potentially arriving at the automatic and fluent use of language. This perspective is largely based on the model of skill acquisition proposed by Anderson (1983), which specifies the roles for explicit knowledge, the role of practice and the conditions in which a system such as this works, all of which potentially have implications for what can be best learned in this way and how it can be learned. The “weak interface” perspective (e.g. Ellis, 1994) proposes that one of the roles of explicit knowledge is to make grammar and vocabulary salient. Thus, according to Ellis, explicit knowledge can aid learners in noticing elements in input, noticing the gap between the input and the learner’s current state of interlanguage, and monitoring before and after output. 

Noticing can be defined as the conscious registration of form in input (Schmidt, 1995) — that is simply being aware that a particular form has just been encountered in input. As such, noticing is a very low level form of consciousness, below that of awareness of what a particular rule may be, and below awareness of how a particular form functions. Though the effect of noticing may be quite subtle, Schmidt claims that noticing plays a key role in converting input into ‘intake’ in second language learning. Intake can be defined in such a way that is appropriate to the discussion of noticing as “the process of assimilating linguistic material”, the end result of which could be the storage of an element in memory or the development of a rule system (Gass 1988). Thus the result of this conscious registration of form in input can simply be, at the lowest level, a record of the event, or, at a higher level, the further development of the rule system.

The noticing of specific forms in input is considered by Schmidt (1994) as an essential and necessary step in learning. This position echoes established points of view in cognitive psychology which suggest that awareness in terms of what is being learned and the ability to report on that learning are generally the default case (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), and that claims of learning without awareness can often be effectively challenged due to a lack of sensitivity to what participants are actually aware of (Shanks & St. John, 1994). This should not, though, rule out “incidental learning” —  the learning of something which is outside of the focus of one’s attention (e.g. Hulstijn, 1992) — nor does it rule out the possibility of implicit learning of some kinds of material (e.g. DeKeyser, 1995). Furthermore, concerning the requirement of the presence of noticing for learning, Schmidt  (1994) himself, referring to Baars (1988), states that “given the fact that it may be impossible to agree upon an operational definition of noticing that will allow falsifiability of this hypothesis, it may be wiser to replace zero-point claims (no learning without noticing) with a modified hypothesis that more noticing leads to more learning” (pp. 17-18). What this suggests, then, is that the noticing hypothesis can be most profitably seen as a view of learning which strongly supports the facilitative effects of consciousness on second language learning. This should not imply that the ‘zero-point’ position — i.e. no learning without noticing — is necessarily untenable, but this strongest expression of the noticing hypothesis does remain controversial, as was pointed out in a recent review (Truscott, 1998) which raises questions about the viability of noticing more abstract and complex grammatical structures. Nevertheless, the purpose of this present study is not to answer this question of the zero-point interpretation of noticing, but to look at the impact of instruction on noticing and the subsequent potential facilitative aspects that consciousness produces.

The processes resulting in noticing can be best accounted for within a framework of attention and memory, making ‘consciousness’ — the essential ingredient of noticing — more clearly defined. Robinson (1995), in a review article on attention, memory, and the noticing hypothesis, defines noticing as “detection plus rehearsal in short-term memory, prior to encoding in long-term memory” (p. 296). Consciousness then would emerge after a certain level of activation is achieved in working memory. Although detection can occur without awareness, the result of this brief, subliminal exposure “cannot be in any useful sense be claimed to be evidence of learning” (p. 298). Conscious awareness, in Robinson’s view, is the result of rehearsal and elaboration of material — that is, thinking about form in input — and is essentially a by-product of task demands which encourage processing that is likely to engage awareness.2 Although the use of the term “consciousness” can be potentially problematic (Schmidt, 1995), the value of this discussion is to place noticing within the larger framework of the research on memory and attention. For this reason, in this paper I will be using Robinson’s definition of noticing as detection coupled with a degree of rehearsal in working memory. Indeed, current conceptions of working memory see it as a place where recollection of previous events can be compared and integrated with current experiences and input (Baddeley, 1993).

Consciousness of linguistic form at the level of noticing items in input, then, can be seen to be a potentially vital part of language learning. The question then arises of what role instruction can play in highlighting and making forms salient for learners. Does instruction have an effect of helping learners to notice forms in input? This is the question which is addressed in this study — the answer to which can perhaps provide evidence for the rather subtle instructional goal of making students aware of grammar and vocabulary in input.

Method

The research for this study was carried out in an English Hungarian bilingual secondary school in Hungary and used 26 participants who were divided into two treatment groups. Participants were first year students at the secondary school and had studied English for an average of 6.5 years. Results of the Oxford Placement Exam grammar section (Allen, 1992) showed that participants were at an intermediate level, that is, somewhere near First Certificate level. A comparison across the two treatment groups of placement exam scores and years of studying English showed no significant differences between them. 

In order to investigate the research question, participants were instructed in either grammar or vocabulary, and then their noticing of these forms in reading was tested in three delayed post-tests. As shown in Table 1, two experimental groups were used in the design of this project, one receiving instruction in grammar and exposure in vocabulary, and the other receiving instruction in vocabulary and exposure in grammar. Thus each group served simultaneously as an experimental group in one area and a control group in another. 

Instruction took place in two 45-minute sessions on consecutive days. The materials consisted of two reading texts of approximately 700 and 425 words, plus exercises to focus participants' attention on and practice either grammar or vocabulary, depending on the group. The reading passages contained all of the target grammar and vocabulary and were the same for each group, although input enhancement in the form of using bold-faced type for target structures was done respective of the group. For grammar, instruction took the form of explanation of target grammar, followed by form-focused practice and then meaning-focused practice using exercises commonly found in current language teaching materials. Vocabulary instruction consisted of exercises where participants needed to guess the meaning of target words in context, the provision of definition of words, and exercises where words needed to be used in context, all modeled on standard language teaching practice. The goal was to provide a wide-variety of exercises in which the participants could focus on both the form and meaning of target items; no attempt was made to pinpoint certain instructional techniques and determine their effect on noticing.

Exposure occurred when participants were exposed to non-instructed items in the reading passages used for each of the two readings. Each vocabulary item and grammatical structure was thus presented twice. Instructions for the initial reading of the text focused participants' attention on meaning and led them to answer comprehension question which referred to each section of the text, ensuring that participants had occasion to encounter each structure.

Target grammar and vocabulary were chosen using the results of a placement test administered to participants. Only items which all participants scored zero on in the placement test were considered for inclusion as target grammar; thus, while prior exposure to these forms cannot be ruled out, students had not year learned these form to a level detectable by the placement test. As no predictions were made in this study concerning which structures would be more or less susceptible to noticing, all scores are calculated as an average across all grammatical forms or vocabulary. A list of target grammar and vocabulary can be found in Appendix 1.

As previously discussed, the definition of noticing which Robinson (1995) proposes is that noticing occurs when features of the input are processed in working memory to a degree where a record is established in long-term memory. Thus, if a conscious memory is established, then subjects should be able to recall this experience shortly after having it. Although long-term memories are by no means always conscious, the definition of noticing used here is based on the view that noticing happens when sufficient processing occurs so as to make a person conscious of a particular structure. Thus, if sufficient processing happens, a record of the event is stored in long-term memory, and thus participants should be able to recall the experience of encountering a particular grammatical form. 

Still the problem exists of differentiating between a conscious memory and just a strong feeling that some item was encountered previously in a reading text. Since the definition of noticing used in this paper depends on the presence of consciousness of form at the point of encountering it in input, simply a hunch that an item was previously encountered will not serve as evidence Thus there is a need for a theoretical distinction and a practical way of testing which can separate between these two types of memories. This problem, though, has already been addressed in research in recognition memory.3Tulving (1985) proposes, among others, two distinct types of memory: episodic memory, which is memory of "personally experienced events", and semantic memory, which is memory for facts and information (p. 3). The key distinction here is that episodic memory captures a memory of the encoding event, that is, encoded in memory is not just a piece of information, but the context in which the contact with this information occurred. According to Tulving, the resulting consciousness generated by episodic memory is a feeling of `remembering', that is the consciousness of having personally encountered this item. Semantic memory, on the other hand, is simply a memory for a fact or piece of information which is not recalled with reference to the context of encoding. The resulting consciousness of semantic memory is a feeling of `knowing', simply the feeling of being aware of a fact or piece of information, without recalling a specific context in which it was encountered. Tulving claims that `remember' judgements can be used to determine whether or not a particular memory was associated with consciousness of item at the time of encountering it. This provides a possible method for testing for noticing: if, according to Robinson's (1995) definition, noticing occurs when sufficient processing has produced conscious awareness of an item in input, the resulting memory would correspond to Tulving's episodic memory and could be tested using the Remember/Know distinction.

In testing for these two types of memory, a procedure has been developed (Gardiner, 1988) in research largely based on recognition memory for words encountered on word lists. Using this procedure, participants are instructed to respond with a `remember' response to any word for which they have a recollection of consciously encountering on a study list, and to respond with a `know' response to any word for which they simply have strong feeling that it was on a previous study list, but for which they do not have a conscious memory of encountering. Various studies (e.g. Gardiner & Java, 1990; Gardiner & Java, 1991; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990) have shown that this Remember/Know distinction can be observed in well-known disassociations between memories for more deeply processed words (largely eliciting a `remember' response) and items processed in a more shallow way (largely eliciting `know' responses). Thus, items eliciting a `remember' response on the testing phase of the noticing test are seen in this study as representing noticing, while `know' responses, though still considered to represent a memory of the item, are not considered to be the product of sufficient processing to be considered examples of noticing.

In this study, noticing was tested on three post-tests, approximately one week, two weeks and six weeks after instruction. This test consisted of two parts. First, participants were instructed to read a 500 word passage containing target items (without any input enhancement) and answer four true or false questions. Next, following a short break, a test of recognition memory based on the Remember/Know distinction was given to determine whether or not participants had noticed grammar and vocabulary in the reading text. Thus, the first part of the noticing test can be considered the input phase, where participants encountered items in input, and the second part, the testing phase.

In the noticing test participants were told that one item in each pair of items had occurred in the text, and they needed to indicate which one was that item.4 Following this, participants were instructed to indicate whether their response was based on an experience of remembering, a feeling of knowing, or whether it was simply a guess (see Appendix 2 for an example of the noticing test).

In order to judge the validity of the responses, items contained on the text of noticing came from two different sources. Group 1 items were those which were the object of instruction or exposure and which were contained in the text used in the noticing test. Responses to these items provide the core of the data presented below and are used in answering the main research question. Group 2 items are those which were the subject of instruction or exposure but which did not appear in the text of noticing. These were included to allow it to be checked if participants were simply giving remember responses because the item had been instructed, or whether the response was because the item had actually appeared on the test. A high amount of noticing of Group 2 items would show that participants' responses were most likely based on the fact that items were instructed before, rather than on having been instructed and also appearing in the reading text used in the noticing test.

Since this data collection technique relies on self-report data in the form of participants making judgements about the very subjective personal states of remembering and knowing, several steps were taken to increase the reliability of these reports, as suggested by Ericsson and Simon (1993). First, the format of the exam and the expectations for responses were explained to the participants previous to the first exam time. Participants were given training and practice in taking the test . Directions were clearly explained, and everyday examples of the Remember/Know distinction were given so as to reinforce the distinction. Second, before each testing time, the instructions were again explained to participants and the basic distinctions were again reinforced. Finally, immediately after the first testing time each subject was engaged in individual retrospection about and discussion of the answers which they gave. Since the distinction between remembering and knowing relies on the remembering of features of the experience of noticing items in input, participants' memories for those events were probed in order to make sure that subjects had a conscious experience associated with each remember response.5

In sum, then, the procedure for the project involved the following steps: 1)input was provided for both groups; 2) instruction or exposure was carried out depending on experimental conditions; 3) training was done in the testing format; 4) post-test one was given at the end of one week, which was immediately followed by retrospection concerning the explanation for participants' responses; and 5) post-tests two and three were given approximately two and six weeks after instruction.

Results

Scores on the noticing test were calculated so as to reflect the accuracy of participants' responses. This was done by taking into consideration both correct and incorrect answers and calculating a score for an individual by subtracting the number of incorrect answers from the correct answers. The result is a score which reflects the accuracy of the participant's noticing.

Table 2 presents the noticing scores for grammar and vocabulary comparing the instruction and exposure group across the three testing times. Concerning grammar, it can be seen that the instruction group outperformed the exposure group in terms of noticing at each of the three testing times, with the difference between the two groups being significantly different at the first testing time (t = 3.050, p = .006).6 Thus it can be seen that instruction has a significant short-term effect on increasing the noticing of grammar in input. As the distance between the time of instruction and the tests grows, scores are lower for both the instructed and exposure group, and the differences between the two groups grow smaller, although the general trend for the instruction group is still to perform better than the exposure group. This change over time can best be captured in Figure 1 overleaf, which is a graph of the grammar figures in Table 2.

The situation for vocabulary is very similar: the instructed group shows a significantly greater difference in noticing of target forms over the exposure group at the first testing time (t = 2.301, p = .03). At testing times two and three, the differences between the two groups are less substantial, with the exposure group even outperforming the instruction group at testing time two, although the results were not significant. Figure 2 overleaf shows these differences over time. Thus for both grammar and vocabulary, the instructed condition shows more noticing at testing time one, while there is a fall off in results over time.7

Furthermore, results for grammar and vocabulary noticing can be compared, which leads to two further points. First, it can be seen in Table 2 that by comparing grammar noticing and vocabulary noticing within the exposure condition, that vocabulary noticing consistently achieves higher scores than grammar noticing across all three testing times. This comparison between grammar and vocabulary noticing within the exposure conditions potentially gives a base measure for noticing unaffected by instruction. The differences at testing time one are statistically significant (t = 2.597, p = .016); the differences at testing times two and three are not. The results suggest that without any instruction, but merely the provision of input in class and on the text used in the noticing test, it is easier to notice vocabulary than grammar.

Secondly, and closely related to the previous point, differences between grammar and vocabulary noticing across the instruction and exposure conditions can be compared, as shown in Table 3. This difference between the instructed and exposure condition will show the strength of the effect of instruction, since the scores for noticing in the instructed condition can be seen as being composed of the effect of instruction on noticing plus the effect of simply being exposed to the items in input. Comparing grammar and vocabulary on this variable will show on which area instruction had the greatest impact. Scores in Table 3 are calculated in terms of the percentage of the total noticing effect which is contributed by instruction. As can be seen in the table, at each testing time, the contribution to total noticing by instruction is higher for grammar than for vocabulary. 

In summary, then, the following results have been found. First, instruction does lead to noticing in input at levels higher than are found for mere exposure for both grammar and vocabulary. Second, the effect of instruction in promoting noticing, while still tending to have an effect, falls off sometime after the second week in these data. Third, vocabulary is more easily noticed than grammar. And, fourth, instruction has a greater effect on enhancing noticing for grammar than for vocabulary.

Discussion

These results lend rather clear support to the idea that one of the effects of instruction is to make learners aware of form in input. Thus the data are in line with theoretical predictions about noticing which place noticing in a framework of attention and memory (e.g. Robinson 1995; Tomlin & Villa, 1994). This suggests that consciousness of form in input is indeed the result of increased depth and elaboration of processing brought about through instruction making grammar and vocabulary being more salient. Furthermore, these results can also serve as empirical documentation of what learners and teachers have long known concerning the experience of noticing form in input. Yet there are also other possible implications as well, beyond confirming these predictions.

First, there is a theoretical link between noticing and learning which makes these results important. Noticing has been ascribed a variety of important roles in second language learning, from being the necessary element in the learning process (e.g. Schmidt, 1994) to being one of several important factors in learning, including moving learners to a higher stage of language processing by the noticing of gaps between one's output and the input (Swain, 1995; Swain & Lapkin, 1995). Thus, although the data presented here do not make an explicit connection between noticing and learning, there is at least a theoretical link between instruction, noticing and learning, where instruction may serve to draw learners' attention to specific forms in input, which may lead to learning.

Second, in the foreign language learning situation, these findings emphasize the importance of the amount and type of input which is provided for students. It appears that when students have had their attention focused on forms through instruction, they then become aware of these forms, think about them and remember them, but only if they are provided with input which contains these forms. Classes or course materials which provide only minimal amounts of input may not be utilizing this opportunity for learning to its full potential. There is also empirical evidence which suggests that if learners are not given the opportunity to encounter forms in input after they have been learning, then they will not retain what they have learned (White, 1991). Furthermore, the evidence presented above for the noticing of forms in input based simply on exposure, provides grounds for believing that when students encounter input, they can become consciously aware of grammar and vocabulary in the right circumstances. Thus a key implication of noticing is that learning does not stop after the lesson, but that students are in a sense primed to learn more if they are given the opportunity to encounter more input.

Furthermore, there is potential in not only considering noticing as a positive byproduct of instruction, but as one of the goals of instruction. That is, rather than taking mastery of course material as the only goal of instruction, awareness of particular grammatical forms or vocabulary items could be a potential low-level, first step goal. A goal like this would be quite realistic if embedded in consciousness-raising or comprehension-based techniques and approaches (cf. Ellis, 1993a, 1993b). These comprehension-based approaches are noteworthy in that comprehension does not appear to be implicated in on processing restrictions which may make production an unattainable goal. (Pienemann, 1984). For these reasons, a decision to include noticing as one goal of teaching appears to be on a sound foundation.

Concerning differences between grammar and vocabulary noticing, these results also suggest that one of the most effective roles of instruction is in helping learners to become aware of grammar in input. Vocabulary seems to be much easier to become aware of naturally, and yet instruction leads to higher levels of noticing of grammar than vocabulary. Thus, given the finite amount of time and resources in the average classroom, it would seem that a focus on grammatical form would be warranted.

Additionally, the classroom may be an ideal place to experience and practice noticing and awareness of the features of input. In the first place, attention, which noticing relies on, is a limited capacity system and thus task demands encountered at the time of input can either limit or encourage noticing (Tomlin & Villa, 1994; Skehan, 1998). The demands placed on learners when they encounter input in natural communication may deplete attentional resources to the point where consciously noticing form may be unlikely. In the classroom, though, students can encounter input in a more sheltered and controlled environment. Thus one role of instruction could be to create appropriate tasks which encourage the noticing of input. Furthermore, the classroom has potential for developing learners' individual abilities in using input for further learning. Beyond external factors such as task demands and type of input encountered, individual differences and individual readiness can influence what is noticed in the input (Skehan, 1988). The classroom, then, can be a place where learner autonomy can be developed by helping students develop an awareness of form in input. 

Finally, the data presented in this study emphasize that there is an important factor to consider in the relationship between instruction and noticing. It was shown that two weeks after instruction, the differences between instruction group and the exposure group were much smaller than encountered within a week after instruction, when noticing was strongly affected by instruction. Although the duration of the effect of noticing is not exactly clear, its effects do appear to be short-lived. This means that for learners to become aware of forms in input through instruction, the input must be encountered soon after instruction for there to be a potential for further learning or reinforcement.

Conclusion

This study has shown that instruction can lead to levels of conscious awareness, or noticing, of grammar and vocabulary in input at significantly higher levels than mere exposure does. Furthermore, links can be drawn between instruction, noticing and learning such that the classroom can be seen as a key area for promoting, developing and encouraging the noticing of form in input as one additional step towards language learning.

Notes
 

1. The research reported on here is a subset of a larger research project (Peckham, 2000). (Back)
2. The types of processing more likely to result in awareness would be considered to be more elaboration and more conceptually rather than perceptually driven (Robinson, 1995).(Back)
3. `Recognition' is shown by the ability to identify that some item has been previously encountered. (Back)
4. This `forced choice' format was used to reduce response bias.(Back)
5. Though, it should be pointed out, that subjects were not required to be able to verbalize the contents of that experience for it to be counted at an instance of remembering. Verbalizations of these sorts are clearly not possible in all cases.(Back)
6. Note that in order to control for the Type 1 error rate due to the use of multiple t-tests, an alpha rate of .031 was established and used with 1-tailed t-tests.(Back)
7. As was noted before in section 4, each test included other items (group 2 items) which were involved in both instruction or exposure, but which were not used in the text for noticing. This was done to check the reliability of the data. Both groups showed positive scores for these items, thus they correctly rejected these items on the test, and no statistically significant differences were found between the two treatment groups at any testing time in either grammar or vocabulary. This ability to distinguish between items which were encountered previously and which were encountered in the text used in the noticing test lends support to the validity of the data collection measures.(Back)

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Appendix 1 

Target grammar and vocabulary items used for testing 

Grammar

cleft sentence emphasizing subjects: 
It was one of the guides who quickly saw a way.

pseudo-cleft emphasizing verbs: 
What our guide did was to cut a narrow path.

possessive with gerund complement: 
We greatly appreciated his showing us the way.

"have a verb" construction: We had a look over the side.

"give a verb" construction: We decided not to give swimming a try.
causative: I nearly got my leg broken.

Vocabulary

Nouns:

principle
propensity
succession

Verbs:

betray
deteriorate
expose
sustain
condense
depict
trigger

Adjectives:

profound

Adverbs:

deliberately

Appendix 2

Examples of the layout of testing items on the noticing test for grammar and vocabulary

On the left hand side of the box there is a pair of items. You must show which of the two items you think was in the reading passage you just read by putting an X next to that item. Next, you need to decide how much you remember about that item by putting an X next to one of the statements on the right hand side.